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 3 
 Local Democracy in Twenty-two Hungarian Cities 
Introduction 
I.  Research objectives 
The goal of the research project undertaken by the Eötvös Károly Public Policy Institute 
was to measure the democratic performance of the local governments in the twenty-two cities 
that have special, so-called county status within the Hungarian municipal system. The twenty-
two cities do not include the metropolitan local government of Budapest because of its special 
size, legal status and unique internal organization. In deciding about the sample of the 
research, it was a crucial consideration that the twenty-two cities with county status form a 
relatively homogenous group in terms of size, legal status, and institutional organization 
within the otherwise very diverse municipal system of about 3,200 municipalities. 
Furthermore, these cities are the home of about one-fifth of the Hungarian population, and 
they also serve, to some extent, as a blueprint for other local governments in terms of 
democratic functioning and practices. 
It has to be emphasized that measuring democratic performance as a social scientific 
enterprize is relatively new, and its methodology is, as of this date, still relatively 
undeveloped. Therefore, projects of the type carried out by the Eötvös Károly Institute are 
best understood as pilot projects, their findings as preliminary, and their conclusions as 
tentative. Nevertheless, we maintain that such pilot researches serve very important purposes. 
First of all, they serve the analytic interest of further developing measurment tools and 
methods, clarifying indicators and indices for future researches. At the end of each chapter, 
we summarize our conclusions concerning the possible directions of developing research 
methodology. But over and above these scientific interests, such pilot projects serve a number 
of practical goals, such as 
• Drawing public interest to the actual realization of local democracy; 
• Initiating pubic discussions as to what citizens might expect from local 
democracy and from their municipal governments; 
• Providing systematic data for local reform initiatives; 
• Providing a basis of comparison for assessing the success of reform initiatives; 
• Drawing the attention of the public to the common problems of the local 
governments, and highlights best practices; 
• Increasing awareness of the significance of democratic practices. 
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 In our assessment, the research project carried out by the Eötvös Károly Institute and 
funded by the Embassy of the United States can serve well the analytic as well as practical 
goals listed above. 
 
II. Methodology 
In the first stage of the research project of measuring local democracy in twenty-two 
Hungarian city local governments, first the indicators of local democracy suitable for the 
specific features of the Hungarian local government structure had to be selected. The selection 
involved an overview of similar projects carried out by researchers in other countries1 as well 
as interviews with local government officials and other local actors in one of the target cities, 
so that the standards used in our survey be adjusted to the particularities of the Hungarian 
situation and reflect the problems as perceived by the practitioners themselves. The interviews 
were conducted in the city of Kecskemét, with the head of the local administration (the 
notary), with an editor of a local daily and with representatives of voluntary organizations. 
Based on these interviews and the established international practice of democracy audits, the 
following framework was developed for the purposes of our research project. 
 
II.1 The concept an dimensions of local democracy 
Most democracy audits rely on two fundamental principles of democratic governance, 
which may be readily applied to measuring local democracy: 
a) Popular control of political decision making, and 
b) Political equality of the citizens in implementing this popular control; 
From this approach, five such democratic values can be identified through which the 
two fundamental principles are realized and which can serve as evaluative criteria for 
assessing local democracy. These are the following: 
i. A guaranteed framework of civil and political rights, including equality 
before the law, 
                                                 
1 The most important democracy audit projects are the following: 
The UK Democratic Audit (http://www.fhit.org/democratic_audit/index.html),  
International IDEA's programme on the “State of Democracy” 
(http://www.idea.int/ideas_work/14_political_state.htm),  
The SNS Democratic Audit of Sweden (www.const.sns.se/dr/english/),  
The Canada Democratic Audit  (www.mta.ca/faculty/arts/canadian_studies/audit.htm),  
The Democratic Audit of the Institutions of European Integration (http://www.one-europe.ac.uk/cgi-
bin/esrc/world/db.cgi/proj.htm?id=29),  
The Democratic Audit of Australia (http://democratic.audit.anu.edu.au/) 
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ii. Open and accountable government, inclding access to information 
about the decision makers and the decision-making process, 
iii. Representative and responsive governance, the distance between local 
decisions and local needs, etc. 
iv. Democratic civil society, the structure of local citizens’ groups and 
voluntary organizations, the role of local media, etc. 
v. Local autonomy, or the level of financial independence that the 
municipalities are able to attain and maintain from the central state 
administration. 
 
Accordingly, six indices correspond to these different dimensions of local democracy. 
The first and second index measures the institutional performance of local governments, while 
the fourth and fifth index shows the democratic contribution of the local society. The third 
index reveals the quality of the relationship between the local government and the local 
society. Finally, index 6 evaluates the joint ability of the local government and local society to 
attain autonomy through mobilizing the resources of the local institutions: 
1. Lawfulness 
2. Transparency 
3. Representation/Responsiveness 
4. Public Sphere 
5. Participation 
6. Local autonomy 
 
II.2 Standardization if indicators 
In all of the six indices, a number of different indicators are aggregated. Since the 
indicators to be aggregated in the six indices are not directly commesurable with one another, 
a method of standardization is required. The standardization method used for the purposes of 
this research is a comparative one that takes as its basis the average performance of the 
institutions to be measured. For each variable, above-the-average performances count as 
good, and below-the-average performances count as poor. However, a certain extent of 
deviation from the average (say, 20%) can indicate very different performances, depending on 
what is the average deviation from the average. More specifically, if in one specific area 
most local governments deviate from the average performance with about 30 to 40%, a 20% 
below-the-average showing is just a slightly poor performance, whereas if the average 
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deviation is just 5%, the same 20% deviation indicates an extremely poor showing. Therefore, 
the method used here will rely on the average deviation from the average as its 
standardization device. 
The following example will show how this standardization method works in practice. 
Suppose that electoral activity is one of the indicators that go into the Participation Index. 
Suppose further that in this complex indicator two distinct components have to be aggregated: 
voter turnout and the number of candidates in electoral districts. In average, seven 
candidates compete in each electoral districts in the 22 cities that figure in our research, and 
voter turnout averages at 45,53%. How are we to assess the 40,2% voter turnout in 
Békéscsaba, along with the 8,8 candidates in its districts? We know that its voter turnout is 
poorer than the average, but the –5,3% deviation does not really tell us the significance of this 
deviation. By contrast, we know that the average deviation from the average voter turnout in 
the twnety-two cities is 5,2%. Thus, we can divide Békéscsaba’s deviation (-5,3) with the 
average deviation (5,2), and we get such a number (-1,03) that can be aggregated with other 
indicators. If we go through the same operation with regard to the number of candidates, we 
see that the average deviation from the average number of candidates here is 1,17, and 
Békéscsaba’s deviation is 1,9. If we divide Békéscsaba’s deviation (1,9) with the average 
deviation (1,17), we get the figure 1,62. If we take the average of the two numbers thus gained 
for Békéscsaba (-1,03 and 1,62), we get an aggregated number of 0,30 for the two 
components as taken together, which shows Békéscsaba to be 7th among the twenty-two cities 
with regard to electoral activity. This is the method of standardization through which two 
heterogenous indicators (voter turnout and the number of candidates per electoral districts) 
can be aggregated into a complex indicator (electoral activity). The Participation Index 
listed above contains a number of different indicators beyond electoral activity. Here follows 
a sample of the indicators that go into the six indices: 
 
II.3 Indices 
1.) Lawfulness Index 
a) The number of notices of irregularity by the Administrative Offices in proportion of 
the total number of cases, 
b) The number of citizen complaints (in proportion of the total number of cases), 
c) The average number of days needed to hear citizen complaints 
d) The number of cases completed after the legal deadline 
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 2.) Transparency Index 
a) The number of closed sessions of the local assembly in proportion of the total number 
of sessions, 
b) Media broadcast of the public sessions, 
c) Available on-line information about the functioning of the local government, 
d) The number of public hearings 
e) The frequency of press conferences held by municipal officials 
 
3.) Representation Index 
a) Institutional links between citizens’ groups and the decision-making process 
b) Personal accessability of mayors and representatives (office hours, e-mail addresses) 
 
4.) Public Sphere Index 
a) The number of local media outlets that covers local affairs at least once a months 
b) The ownership structure of the local media 
c) The total number of articles in local newspapers that cover local affairs 
d) The total amount of air-time of progarms that cover local affairs in the local radio and 
television stations 
 
5.) Participation Index 
a) Voter turnout 
b) The average number of candidates in the electoral districts 
c) Citizens’ attendance at public hearings 
d) The number of local public initiatives (demonstrations, petitions, etc.) 
e) Membership of voluntary organizations as proportion of the total populace 
 
6.) Autonomy Index 
a) The amount of local revenues (local taxes) in proportion of the total revenues of the 
local government 
b) The amount of discretionary spending in proportion of the whole budget 
c) The extent of central regulation of local government services 
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 II.4 Sources of the data 
The data needed for the research were drawn from various sources, such as public (local 
and national) databases, the official websites of the local governments, and two surveys that 
were constructed specifically for the purposes of this research. One survey was to be 
completed by local government officials, while the other by editors of the local media outlets 
(newspapers, radio and tv stations, internet-based newsportals). The customized survey forms 
containing all the detailed requests for information has been mailed to the responsible officials 
at the twenty-two local governments as of early November. Most local governments 
responded immediately, indicating their willingness to cooperate in the research. However, 
some of the local governments did not return their data until as late as early January, despite 
their legal obligation to do so, and repeated urging by the institute. One municipality, that of 
the city of Nyíregyháza, failed to provide data altogether. Therefore, Nyíregyháza had to be 
excluded from the research. The processing of the data available from independent databases 
and other sources or provided by the municipalities took place in December and January, with 
the final evaluations completed in February, 2004. 
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III. Lawfulness 
 Local governments and their specific agencies have both law-making and law-
enforcement functions. The city councils have the power to introduce municipal statutes in 
legislative areas not regulated by higher-order laws, and they also serve as law-enforcement 
agencies in various fields. In both their law-making and law-enforcement functions, they 
operate under the supervision of the administrative organs of the state. The Lawfulness Index 
intends to capture the extent to which local government agencies abide by the rules of law 
issued by the national government or the local government. The following indicators are 
intended to capture the extent of lawfulness: 
• Number of administrative cases completed beyond the legal deadline; 
• Number of administrative decisions altered or annulled upon appeal; 
• Number of notices of irregularity made by the Administrative Offices2 in 
proportion of the total number of cases; 
• Number of complaints per 10,000 inhabitants 
 
Missing the legal deadline is entirely the local government’s responsibility; therefore, it is a 
good indicator of institutional performance. The data do not indicate great varioation from 
one year to another, and the range of cases completed beyond deadline extends from 0% in 
Szolnok to 16% in Kecskemét. The average figure for all cities is 2.81% 
 
Table 1 
Ranking City Number of administrative cases not 
completed until deadlinein 2001 and 
2002  (%) 
1. Szolnok 0,00 
2. Pécs 0,02 
3. Dunaújváros 0,02 
4. Tatabánya 0,08 
5. Szombathely 0,09 
6. Debrecen 0,14 
7. Miskolc 0,46 
8. Veszprém 0,47 
9. Salgótarján 0,48 
10. Székesfehérvár 0,78 
                                                 
2 The Administrative Offices are the territorial agencies of the national government in charge of supervising the 
local governments’ functioning. 
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11. Békéscsaba 0,93 
12. Szekszárd 0,97 
13. Sopron 1,10 
14. Zalaegerszeg 2,76 
15. Nagykanizsa 2,80 
16. Győr 3,33 
17. Eger 4,07 
18. Szeged 4,29 
19. Hódmezővásárhely 8,83 
20. Kaposvár 11,41 
21. Kecskemét 15,92 
 
 The indicator reflecting the number of administrative cases altered or reversed upon 
appeal is meant to capture the lawfulness of the first-order administrative rulings. In this 
regard, the average performance of the local governments in this research is much better than 
in connection with missing the legal deadlines. The average proportion of cases altered or 
reversed is less than one tenth of one percent (0,09%), ranging from 0,004% in Kaposvár to 
0,31% in Győr. 
 
Table 2 
Ranking City Number of altered or reversed rulings after 
appeal in 2001 and 2002 (‰) 
1. Kaposvár 0,004 
2. Kecskemét 0,024 
3. Salgótarján 0,034 
4. Tatabánya 0,041 
5. Dunaújváros 0,046 
6. Szekszárd 0,053 
7. Pécs 0,056 
8. Békéscsaba 0,064 
9. Hódmezővásárhely 0,065 
10. Debrecen 0,069 
11. Eger 0,075 
12. Zalaegerszeg 0,084 
13. Miskolc 0,086 
14. Szeged 0,087 
15. Sopron 0,088 
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16. Veszprém 0,096 
17. Szolnok 0,108 
18. Nagykanizsa 0,154 
19. Székesfehérvár 0,160 
20. Szombathely 0,287 
21. Győr 0,309 
 
The national government exercises lawfulness supervision over the local governments 
through the territorial Administrative Offices. The director of the Administrative Office 
revises local government resolutions, decrees and statutes, the local government’s 
organization, operation and its procedure, and it may issue notices of irregularity to the 
municipality, which may, in turn, appeal these notices. Our survey has found that in average, 
local governments receive a very low number of such notices. In particular, a number of cities 
(Dunaújváros, Győr, Hódmezővásárhely, Kaposvár, Szolnok, Tatabánya, Veszprém, 
Zalaegerszeg) did not receive such notices in the year 2002. the other extreme was 
Salgótarján with its 32 notices in 2002. the overall average was 1,55, and the ranking is as 
follows: 
 
Table 3 
Ranking City Number of irregularity notices by the 
Administrative Office, in % of the number 
of agenda entries of the city council 
1-8 Dunaújváros 0,00 
1-8 Győr 0,00 
1-8 Hódmezővásárhely 0,00 
1-8 Kaposvár 0,00 
1-8 Szolnok 0,00 
1-8 Tatabánya 0,00 
1-8 Veszprém 0,00 
1-8 Zalaegerszeg 0,00 
9 Eger 0,30 
10 Szekszárd 0,34 
11 Kecskemét 0,36 
12 Pécs 0,46 
13 Nagykanizsa 0,51 
14 Debrecen 0,65 
15 Békéscsaba 0,72 
 12 
Ranking City Number of irregularity notices by the 
Administrative Office, in % of the number 
of agenda entries of the city council 
16 Szombathely 1,03 
17 Szeged 1,59 
18 Miskolc 3,39 
19 Sopron 3,53 
20 Salgótarján 18,08 
 
 Complaints are filed by citizens to correct individual rights violations or harms 
incurred by an alleged failure or fault on the part of the local government or one of its 
officials. A difficulty with this data is that some of the municipalities did not provide this 
figure, while others indicated that the number of complaints was zero. Thus, according to the 
data available to us, the average number of complaints is 0,14%, or 14 complaints per 10,000 
inhabitants. 
 
Table 4 
Ranking City Number of complaints in 2001 and 2002 per 10,000 
inhabitants 
1-2. Szekszárd 0,00 
1-2. Szombathely 0,00 
3. Szeged 0,46 
4. Tatabánya 0,55 
5. Dunaújváros 0,93 
6. Veszprém 2,52 
7. Kecskemét 4,43 
8. Győr 5,57 
9. Eger 6,50 
10. Szolnok 8,35 
11. Békéscsaba 10,39 
12. Zalaegerszeg 10,95 
13. Miskolc 14,34 
14. Nagykanizsa 16,14 
15. Pécs 21,93 
16. Hódmezővásárhely 41,45 
17. Sopron 46,91 
18. Debrecen 62,67 
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 III.1 Lawfulness Index 
Table 5 shows the average of the above indicators, based on the procedure of 
standardization described in the methodological introduction above. The overall figures 
produced by the aggregation of the different indicators show the Lawfulness Index. It has to 
be borne in mind, though, that since some of the local governments provided less than 
exhaustive data, the validity of the figures shown here is somewhat limited. 
 
Table 5: Lawfulness Index 
Rank
ing City 
Lawfulness Index 
(average of 
standardized 
indicators) 
Lawfulness 
Index (100-
degree scale) 
Geographic location3 
Size4 
1. Dunaújváros 61 100 West small 
2. Veszprém 46 8 West small 
3. Békéscsaba 40 85 East small 
4. Szolnok 40 85 East small 
5. Pécs 39 84 East large 
6. Zalaegerszeg 35 81 West small 
7. Miskolc 24 73 East large 
8. Szekszárd 14 66 West small 
9. Eger 13 65 East small 
10. Tatabánya 7 61 West small 
11. Szombathely 6 60 West small 
12. Szeged -6 51 East large 
13. Kaposvár -7 51 West small 
14. Sopron -8 50 West small 
15. Kecskemét -30 34 East large 
16. Győr -35 30 West large 
17. Debrecen -37 29 East large 
18. Nagykanizsa -57 14 West small 
19. Hódmezővásárhely -62 11 East small 
20. Székesfehérvár -67 7 West large 
21. Salgótarján -77 0 East small 
 
There is only one city (Dunaújváros) that ranked in the upper third in all of the indicators. It 
appears that city size have a perceptible impact on the lawfulness of a municipality’s 
                                                 
3 East or West of the river Danube. 
4 Small cities are those that have less than 100,000 inhabitants. 
 14 
functioning: smaller cities ranked significantly better than the larger ones. Likewise, the local 
governments West of the danube fared better than their Eastern counterparts. 
 
III.2 Methodological observations about the Lawfulness Index 
Further research in the area may be extended to cover the following questions: 
• Is there an official whose explicit duties include the handling of citizens’ complaints? 
• If yes, what is the organizational position of this official? 
• What are his/her powers 
• How the experiences from these complaints are channelled back to the functioning of 
the local government? 
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IV. Transparency 
 
The transparency of the functioning of local governments is the measure of the realization 
of at least two fundamental rights, the right to self-government and the freedom of access to 
information and distribution of information. Transparency means, first and foremost, the 
freedom of citizens to have access to information concerning the functioning of the local 
government, and the accountability of those in power by the opposition. Therefore, the 
indicators are as follows: 
• The number of closed city council sessions in proportion of the total number of 
sessions 
• The number of secret votes in proportion of the total number of votes 
• Public (radio or television) broadcasting of the open sessions 
• Frequency of public forums, hearings, etc. 
• Frequency of press conferences 
• Amount of information posted on the local government’s official website 
Regarding the opposition’s power to hold those in power accountable: 
• The range of positions (committee chairmen, vice-mayors, etc.) granted to the 
opposition. 
As far as the proportion of closed sessions is concerned, it must be noted that as a general 
rule stipulated by the relevant national laws, city council sessions are open to the public. 
Exceptions are those sessions or agenda entries that concern sensitive personal information or 
the business interests of the city. Here, we discuss only the second class of exceptions, those 
that concern business interests. The basis of the calculation is the total number of agenda 
entries discussed by the council, and the proportion of entries discussed at closed sessions, 
rather than the total number of sessions. According to the overall average, 7% of the total 
number of agenda entries is heard at closed sessions. 
 
Table 6 
Ranking City 
Proportion ofagenda entries heard at  closed 
sessions (2002-2003 average, %) 
1. Salgótarján 0,00 
2. Kaposvár 0,16 
3. Győr 0,47 
4. Debrecen 0,81 
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5. Veszprém 1,50 
6. Dunaújváros 2,16 
7. Tatabánya 2,38 
8. Békéscsaba 2,55 
9. Sopron 3,26 
10. Kecskemét 4,64 
11. Hódmezővásárhely 6,47 
12. Szolnok 6,70 
13. Szeged 7,83 
14. Zalaegerszeg 8,06 
15. Pécs 11,00 
16. Miskolc 11,02 
17. Székesfehérvár 11,96 
18. Szombathely 12,62 
19. Szekszárd 14,33 
20. Eger 16,10 
21. Nagykanizsa 23,38 
 
According to the relevant rules of law, the city council may hold secret vote in nearly 
all of the cases, with a few exceptions. Should secret voting become too frequent, however, it 
would constitute a serious infringement of the citizens’ right to know what the elected 
officials are doing during the decision-making process. However, our research has found that 
city councils do not very often resort to secret voting. The overall average indicates that city 
councils hold secret voting in about 1% of the total number of votes, ranging from 0% in 
Nagykanizsa, Salgótarján, Szeged, Szekszárd to 10% in Miskolc. The ranking is as 
follows: 
 
Table 7 
Ranking City 
Proportion of secret votes (2002-2003 average, 
%) 
1.-4. Nagykanizsa 0,00 
1.-4. Salgótarján 0,00 
1.-4. Szeged 0,00 
1.-4. Szekszárd 0,00 
5. Kecskemét 0,09 
6. Békéscsaba 0,11 
7. Zalaegerszeg 0,11 
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8. Tatabánya 0,15 
9. Kaposvár 0,16 
10. Székesfehérvár 0,20 
11. Szolnok 0,21 
12. Pécs 0,22 
13. Szombathely 0,47 
14. Győr 0,47 
15. Hódmezővásárhely 0,47 
16. Dunaújváros 0,48 
17. Veszprém 0,60 
18. Debrecen 1,95 
19. Eger 4,62 
20 Miskolc 10,17 
 
As far as the public broadcasting of council sessions is concerned, two cities mandate in 
statutes such broadcasting, and further 15 cities broadcast the sessions in full length, without 
editing. In preparing the ranking, we used the following weighing: 3 points were given to 
cities with full-length, unedited broadcast, 2 points to less than full length but unedited 
broadcasting, and 0 point was given to cities where there was no unedited broadcasting. 
 
Table 8 
Ranking City Score 
1-17. Debrecen 3 
1-17. Dunaújváros 3 
1-17. Eger 3 
1-17. Hódmezővásárhely 3 
1-17. Kaposvár 3 
1-17. Kecskemét 3 
1-17. Miskolc 3 
1-17. Nagykanizsa 3 
1-17. Pécs 3 
1-17. Sopron 3 
1-17. Szeged 3 
1-17. Székesfehérvár 3 
1-17. Szekszárd 3 
1-17. Szolnok 3 
1-17. Szombathely 3 
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1-17. Tatabánya 3 
1-17. Zalaegerszeg 3 
18. Békéscsaba 2 
19-21. Győr 0 
19-21. Salgótarján 0 
19-21. Veszprém 0 
 
According to the Local Government Act, every local government must hold at least one 
public hearing each year. Besides, they are free to hold other public forums to discuss specific 
issues in the public interest or to provide information about specific decisions or policies. Our 
survey examined the frequency of such forums. As far as public hearings are concerned, the 
cities typically hold, at best, just the legal minimum number of such events. The other forums 
show greater variation. Bellow, we indicate the average figures for the years 2002 and 2003. 
 
Table 9 
Ranking City Public hearings Other forums Total 
1. Salgótarján 1,0 14,0 15,0 
2. Hódmezővásárhely 1,0 11,0 12,0 
3. Szeged 1,0 10,5 11,5 
4. Eger 1,0 8,5 9,5 
5. Győr 0,5 8,0 8,5 
6. Veszprém 1,0 3,0 4,0 
7. Dunaújváros 1,0 2,5 3,5 
8. Sopron 1,0 1,5 2,5 
9-10. Kecskemét 1,5 0,0 1,5 
9-10. Zalaegerszeg 1,5 0,0 1,5 
11-17. Debrecen 1,0 0,0 1,0 
11-17. Kaposvár 1,0 0,0 1,0 
11-17. Nagykanizsa 1,0 0,0 1,0 
11-17. Székesfehérvár 1,0 0,0 1,0 
11-17. Szekszárd 1,0 0,0 1,0 
11-17. Szolnok 1,0 0,0 1,0 
11-17. Szombathely 1,0 0,0 1,0 
18-21. Békéscsaba 0,5 0,0 0,5 
18-21. Miskolc 0,5 0,0 0,5 
18-21. Pécs 0,5 0,0 0,5 
18-21. Tatabánya 0,5 0,0 0,5 
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 As far as the positions granted by the parties controlling the city council to the opposition 
parties are concerned, it is important to bear in mind that through the positions of committee 
chairman and councillor, the opposition parties can hold the majority accountable and make 
the proceedings of the local government more transparent. In assessing the positions granted 
to the opposition, we counted the chairman of the budget committee with double weight, due 
to its importance with respect to the transparency of the businesses conducted by the city. 
Interestingly, we found that with a few exceptions (Békéscsaba, Győr, Hódmezővásárhely, 
Kecskemét, Szeged, Székesfehérvár és Szombathely) the majority of the cities grant this 
crucial position to the opposition. This may indicate a commitment to accountability in most 
local governments. The overall average figure of the twenty-two cities, weighed as indicated 
above, is 34,4%, ranging from 0% in Székesfehérvár to 64,2% in Nagykanizsa. 
 
Table 10 
Ranking City Total number of opposition committee 
chairmen and councillors 
Proportion of opposition committee 
chairmen and councillors  (%) 
1. Nagykanizsa 5 62,5 
2. Sopron 5 55,6 
3. Zalaegerszeg 5 50,0 
4. Salgótarján 5 45,5 
5. Eger 7 43,8 
6. Miskolc 7 38,9 
7. Debrecen 5 38,5 
8. Győr 6 37,5 
9. Szolnok 6 37,5 
10. Szeged 4 36,4 
11. Hódmezővásárhely 5 35,7 
12. Veszprém 5 35,7 
13. Kecskemét 4 33,3 
14. Kaposvár 3 33,3 
15. Dunaújváros 4 30,8 
16. Szekszárd 2 28,6 
17. Pécs 5 25,0 
18. Szombathely 3 25,0 
19. Tatabánya 3 20,0 
20. Békéscsaba 1 10,0 
21. Székesfehérvár 0 0,0 
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 IV.1 Transparency Index 
The overall ranking of the twenty-two cities in the Transparency Index that reflects the 
aggregation of the different indicators with the standardization method described above, is as 
follows: 
 
Table 11 Transparency Index 
Ranking City Transparency 
Index (average of 
standardized 
indicators) 
Transparency 
Index (100-
degree scale) 
Geographic 
location 
Size 
1. Szeged 71 100 East large 
2. Kaposvár 62 93 West small 
3. Sopron 32 71 West small 
4. Debrecen 28 68 East large 
5. Salgótarján 19 61 East small 
6. Győr 17 59 West large 
7. Hódmezővásárhely 15 58 East small 
8. Szolnok 15 58 East small 
9. Nagykanizsa 11 55 West small 
10. Zalaegerszeg 9 53 West small 
11. Veszprém 8 53 West small 
12. Kecskemét 4 50 East large 
13. Dunaújváros -5 43 West small 
14. Szombathely -6 42 West small 
15. Pécs -10 39 West large 
16. Tatabánya -16 35 West small 
17. Eger -27 26 East small 
18. Székesfehérvár -47 11 West large 
19. Békéscsaba -52 8 East small 
20. Miskolc -60 2 East large 
21. Szekszárd -62 0 West small 
 
The figures indicate that cities with less than 100,000 inhabitants tend to have more 
transparent local governments than their larger counterparts. 
 
IV.2 Methodological observations about the Transparency Index 
In connection with the Transparency Index, the major challenge of future researches 
could be not so much identifying new indicators as the fine-tuning of the current ones. For 
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instance, researchers are yet to establish reliable methods of capturing the quality and 
content of the discussion at public hearings and other public forums of political 
deliberation. Or, in connection with the positions granted to the opposition parties, future 
researches may include, over and above committee chairmen and councillors, the 
management of city-owned businesses and the chairmen of public endowments funded by the 
local government. Furthermore, in larger cities where multiple and often entangled economic 
and political interests interact to shape policy decisions, the cohesiveness of the different 
party factions in the city council can lend a measure of stability and accountability, insofar 
that the citizens are in a position to know which groups to attribute different decisions. The 
cohesiveness of party factions makes it possible to better discern the positions represented by 
the different political forces; by contrast, the greater is the intra-party fragmentation of votes, 
the more difficult it is for voters to attribute political responsibility. Voting statistics at the 
city council sessions may provide useful data to establish party cohesiveness. 
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V. Representation/Responsiveness 
 
In the course of municipal elections, citizens want to elect representatives and mayors who 
adequately represent their views and interests, and we expect our elected leaders to consult 
people’s views and problems in the period between two elections as well. The Representation 
Index is meant to capture the extent to which the views held within local society are 
transformed into policy decisions by the local government and its officials. Since it is next to 
impossible to continuously track the shifting views that are present in the local societies of 
various cities, we had to resort to indirect methods of establishing whether local decision-
makers in fact seek to reflect local opinions in their decisions. Such indirect measures may be, 
for instance, the willingness of elected officials to systematically incorporate citizen groups 
and other voluntary organizations in the decision-making process, or the readiness of the local 
government to actively seek a better knowledge of local opinion through polls, survey, etc. 
other indicators include various voting statistics. The Representation Index comprises the 
following indicators: 
• Proportionality of representation 
• Representation of women in the city council 
• Level of contestedness of the seats 
• Proportion of non-councilmen committee members 
• Incorporation of voluntary organizations in the decision-making process 
• Frequency of polls and surveys 
 
The proportionality indicator measures the amount of votes cast on such parties or 
organizations that did not gain representation in the city council. In this case, the smaller the 
number the better is the given city’s proportionality value. The overall average figure of the 
twenty-two cities is 38,2%: this is the proportion of votes that did not transform into political 
representation. The range stretches from 27,6% in Pécs to 57,1% in Szekszárd. The ranking is 
as follows: 
 
Table 12 
Ranking City Votes not translated into seats (%) 
1. Pécs 27,60 
2. Tatabánya 31,20 
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3. Zalaegerszeg 31,22 
4. Miskolc 32,08 
5. Székesfehérvár 33,24 
6. Kaposvár 33,94 
7. Debrecen 34,00 
8. Győr 34,54 
9. Veszprém 34,71 
10. Szolnok 35,43 
11. Hódmezővásárhely 35,92 
12. Szeged 36,81 
13. Eger 39,65 
14. Salgótarján 40,00 
15. Szombathely 40,28 
16. Sopron 43,11 
17. Nagykanizsa 44,03 
18. Kecskemét 45,13 
19. Dunaújváros 47,72 
20. Békéscsaba 48,51 
21. Szekszárd 57,10 
 
The quality of representation is greatly determined by the proportionality of 
representation of different social groups in the city council, because serious 
underrepresentation of certain groups may easily lead to distorted public policy choices. A 
variety of dimensions – ethnicity, gender or region – may be relevant here, but the constraints 
on the scope of this research made it possible to examine only one dimension, i.e. the 
representation of women in the city councils. While women form a majority of the voting-age 
population, it is remarkable that only 13% of the councilmembers in the twenty-two cities are 
women. The range stretches from an extreme 3% in Szombathely to 21% in Zalaegerszeg and 
Hódmezővásárhely, which is still very low. Local governments with a left-leaning coalition 
and those in the Western part of the country fared slightly better than the others. 
 
Table 13 
Ranking City Proportion 
of women 
1. Zalaegerszeg 21% 
2. Hódmezővásárhely 21% 
3. Salgótarján 20% 
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4. Miskolc 19% 
5. Dunaújváros 19% 
6. Szekszárd 17% 
7. Pécs 16% 
8. Debrecen 16% 
9. Sopron 15% 
10. Kecskemét 15% 
11. Szolnok 15% 
12. Kaposvár 14% 
13. Szeged 14% 
14. Győr 11% 
15. Nagykanizsa 11% 
16. Eger 8% 
17. Veszprém 7% 
18. Békéscsaba 7% 
19. Tatabánya 7% 
20. Székesfehérvár 6% 
21. Szombathely 3% 
 
The idea behind including the contestedness of seats as an indicator of representation 
into the Representation Index is the assumption that if seats are closely contested, candidates 
will seek to construct programs that represent the views of the majority. The method of 
calculating contestedness was to take the average margin between the winner and the second 
candidate in each district of a city. The following table contains the figures drawn from the 
1998 and 2002 municipal elections. 
The overall average of the twenty-two cities is 15,23%. The figures also reveal that the 
margin has increased in all but two cities between 1998 and 2002, which may partly be 
attributed to the fact that by now, most of the cities became the “domain” of one or another 
large party. 
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Table 14 
Ranking City Contestedness (1998) Contestedness (2002) Average (1998 and 2002, %)
1. Békéscsaba 10,46 9,12 9,79 
2. Szekszárd 8,75 10,87 9,81 
3. Sopron 7,07 13,41 10,24 
4. Szolnok 8,78 14,59 11,69 
5. Kecskemét 12,20 11,57 11,89 
6. Eger 10,49 15,18 12,84 
7. Hódmezővásárhely 12,05 14,37 13,18 
8. Zalaegerszeg 12,91 13,44 13,21 
9. Nagykanizsa 7,06 21,35 14,21 
10. Kaposvár 11,97 18,16 15,07 
11. Debrecen 12,14 19,87 16,01 
12. Dunaújváros 14,20 17,93 16,07 
13. Szeged 14,43 17,71 16,07 
14. Salgótarján 11,99 20,77 16,38 
15. Veszprém 12,85 20,63 16,74 
16. Szombathely 16,08 17,45 16,77 
17. Győr 14,15 20,25 17,20 
18. Székesfehérvár 8,91 26,55 17,73 
19. Tatabánya 12,51 28,77 20,64 
20. Miskolc 10,64 32,06 21,35 
21. Pécs 13,52 32,46 22,99 
 
The practice of including so-called external members in the local government’s 
decision-making process through membership in the standing committees was intended to 
enhance the representation of expert views as well as popular concerns in the representative 
bodies. This practice may directly increase representation; however, a measure of caution is in 
order here, because it is common knowledge that in many local governments external 
membership is allocated on the basis of party allegiances. (This practice is explicitly 
formulated in Miskolc and Tatabánya). The overall percentage of the so-called external 
members in proportion of the total number of representatives is 39,4%, ranging from 0% in 
Pécs to 46,4% in Kaposvár. 
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Table 15 
Ranking City Number of external members in proportion of 
all committee members (%) 
1. Kaposvár 46,4 
2. Hódmezővásárhely 44,9 
3. Salgótarján 44,4 
4. Miskolc 44,3 
5. Szombathely 44,1 
6. Békéscsaba 43,8 
7. Nagykanizsa 43,8 
8. Székesfehérvár 43,6 
9. Tatabánya 43,1 
10. Dunaújváros 43,0 
11. Kecskemét 42,6 
12. Zalaegerszeg 42,5 
13. Eger 41,1 
14. Sopron 40,4 
15. Szolnok 40,3 
16. Győr 38,5 
17. Debrecen 38,1 
18. Veszprém 37,7 
19. Szeged 35,3 
20. Szekszárd 30,3 
21. Pécs 0,0 
 
The Local Government Act makes it mandatory for local governments to sustain systematic 
relations with the citizens’ voluntary organizations, and to draw them into the decision-
making process. The different local governments established various forms of links to 
substantiate this obligation, which is not very easy to capture through any single indicator. For 
the purposes of this research, we have identified four main aspects to assess the quality of the 
relations between a local governments and the citizens’ organizations in place: 
• Do citizens’ organizations have the possibility to file proposals for the annual agenda 
of the local government, or to make motions at the sessions of the city council? 
• To what extent might citizens’ organizations be represented and participate in the 
sessions of the city council? 
• What is the rank of the local government official in charge of the relations with 
citizens’ organizations 
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• To what extent citizens’ might organizations contribute to the preparation of the 
proposals presented before the city council? 
The figures provided for these four aspects are weighed in accordance with the scope and 
extent of the rights granted to the voluntary organizations. The ranking of the cities is as 
follows: 
 
Table 16 
Ranking City Motions to 
the agenda 
Participation in 
the city council 
Rank of 
contact person
Preparation of 
proposals 
Total 
1. Győr 2 3 3 3 11 
2.-3. Szolnok 2 3 1 3 9 
2.-3. Zalaegerszeg 2 2 2 3 9 
4.-9. Hódmezővásárhely 1 2 2 2 7 
4.-9. Nagykanizsa 2 2 2 1 7 
4.-9. Pécs 3 2 1 1 7 
4.-9. Sopron 1 3 1 2 7 
4.-9. Székesfehérvár 3 2 1 1 7 
4.-9. Szombathely 3 1 2 1 7 
10.-16. Békéscsaba 1 2 1 2 6 
10.-16. Eger 1 1 1 3 6 
10.-16. Kaposvár 1 1 3 1 6 
10.-16. Kecskemét 1 1 3 1 6 
10.-16. Miskolc 1 1 2 2 6 
10.-16. Szekszárd 1 1 3 1 6 
10.-16. Tatabánya 2 1 2 1 6 
17.-20. Debrecen 1 2 1 1 5 
17.-20. Salgótarján 1 1 2 1 5 
17.-20. Szeged 1 2 1 1 5 
17.-20. Veszprém 1 1 2 1 5 
21. Dunaújváros 1 1 1 1 4 
 
As far as the polls and surveys conducted by the local governments are concerned, the 
research revealed very limited such efforts on the part of the municipalities. In all, four cities 
have conducted opinion polls in the last two years, and nine cities have conducted surveys to 
measure customer satisfaction with the local administrative offices. In addition, a majority of 
the cities have some kind of quality insurance system in place. In our calculations, opinion 
polls were counted with double weight. The ranking is as follows: 
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Table 17 
Ranking City Number of opinion 
polls 
Number of consumer 
satisfaction surveys 
Weighed 
indicator 
1. Dunaújváros 0 6 6 
2. Győr 0 4 4 
3.-6. Békéscsaba 1 1 3 
3.-6. Hódmezővásárhely 1 1 3 
3.-6. Kecskemét 0 3 3 
3.-6. Pécs 1 1 3 
7.-8. Székesfehérvár 1 0 2 
7.-8. Zalaegerszeg 0 2 2 
9.-10. Kaposvár 0 1 1 
9.-10. Sopron 0 1 1 
11.-21. Debrecen 0 0 0 
11.-21. Eger 0 0 0 
11.-21. Miskolc 0 0 0 
11.-21. Nagykanizsa 0 0 0 
11.-21. Salgótarján 0 0 0 
11.-21. Szeged 0 0 0 
11.-21. Szekszárd 0 0 0 
11.-21. Szolnok 0 0 0 
11.-21. Szombathely 0 0 0 
11.-21. Tatabánya 0 0 0 
11.-21. Veszprém 0 0 0 
 
V.1 Representation Index 
Based on these five indicators, it was possible to get, through aggregation, the overall 
Representation Index ranking of the twenty-two cities. The first place of Győr is attributable 
to its efforts to learn more about local opinions. The second place of Zalaegerszeg is due to its 
consistently good ranking through all five indicators. It must be noted, however, that the 
Representation Index combines facts that are within the local governments’ power to 
influence (external members, polls, contact with citizens’ groups) with such circumstances 
that are entirely beyond its power (proportionality, contestedness). Thus, it could occur that 
even though Székesfehérvár made efforts to strengthen representation, the circumstances of 
its electoral politics made it one of the laggards in overall representation. Therefore, 
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methodologically it may be favorable to divide this index into the separate indices of 
representation proper (consisting of the indicators of proportionality and contestedness) and 
of responsiveness (consisting of the other indicators that reflect the local governments’ 
efforts to track and respond to local opinion). At the end of this study, in drawing the overall 
ranking of the twenty-two cities, we have separated those dimensions of local democracy that 
can be directly influenced by the local government, from the ones that are, to some extent, 
externally determined circumstances from the point of view of the local governments. In this 
separation, the different components of the Representation Index fall on different sides of this 
division (see Summaries I and II). 
 
Table 18 Representation Index 
Ran
king 
City Representation Index 
(average of 
standardized 
indicators) 
Representation 
Index (100-degree 
sclae) 
Geographic 
location 
Size 
1. Győr 85 100 West large 
2. Zalaegerszeg  76 94 West small 
3. Hódmezővásárhely 54 80 East small 
4. Szolnok  31 65 East small  
5. Békéscsaba 22 59 East small 
6. Kecskemét 18 56 East large 
7. Sopron 18 56 West small 
8. Kaposvár 17 56 West small 
9. Szekszárd 3 46 West small 
10. Szombathely 0 44 West small 
11. Dunaújváros -1 43 West small 
12. Eger -9 38 East small 
13. Nagykanizsa -11 37 West small 
14. Tatabánya  -23 29 East small 
15. Miskolc -27 26 East large 
16. Debrecen -29 25 East large 
17. Salgótarján -35 21 East small 
18. Veszprém  -36 21 West small 
19. Szeged -43 16 East large 
20. Székesfehérvár -44 15 West large 
21. Pécs -67 0 West large 
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Looking at the overall ranking in the Representation Index, we find that Representation – or at 
least those components of it that can be influenced by the decision-makers – correlates 
strongly with city size but not with geographic location. Thus, cities with less than 100,000 
inhabitants make markedly larger efforts to make policy represent local opinion. The smaller 
cities have an average of 49 points, compared with the 34 points achieved by the larger ones. 
 
V.2 Methodological observations about the Representation Index 
In future researches, an indicator of local political autonomy may be developed to capture the 
dependence or lack thereof of local party chapters from the national party organizations in 
selecting candidates, making coalitions and deciding about local policy. Experience shows 
that conflicts are not infrequent between local party leaders and national party bodies in these 
matters, and it may be argued that abiding by the demands of national politics limits the local 
leaders ability to be responsive to local demands. However, tracking dependence on national 
party organizations require extensive field-research and interviews with local leaders. 
Likewise, extensive fieldwork may shed more light on the level of involvement of local 
citizens’ organizations in electoral politics (endorsement, campaigning, etc.). 
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VI. Public Sphere 
By public sphere we mean a domain of discussing common issues that is accessible to 
everyone. The most important institutions of the public sphere are the printed and electronic 
media. While the Transparency Index discussed in Chapter 2 captures the local governments’ 
readiness and willingness to make their activities known or knowable to all (and of course 
part of this happens through the various printed and electronic media), the Public Sphere 
Index is meant to measure the local society’s capacity to sustain a pluralist media 
environment that covers local political and social issues. The contribution of a strong pluralist 
public sphere to democracy takes at least three distinct yet interrelated forms: 
• It enables citizens to make informed and considered choices when they elect local 
decision-makers or take part in referenda, etc. 
• The information uncovered and distributed by the media makes it possible for citizens 
to hold their elected leaders accountable for their actions and decisions. 
• A pluralist media environment presses politicians as well as citizens to formulate their 
views more precisely and with better arguments in response to the counterarguments 
of those holding opposing views. This contributes to the evolution of views of elected 
leaders as well as of citizens and also to a better understanding of the problems faced 
by the local community. 
 
The media environment is capable of performing all these functions only if it is financially 
feasible and editorially independent. Therefore, the Public Sphere Index attempts to capture 
the characteristic features of the local media environment, because this is the one dimension 
of the public sphere that may be most reliably measured. In the course of this inquiry, we 
restricted the survey to those media outlets that provide substantial coverage of political and 
social issues, and we excluded media directed exclusively (or predominantly) at 
entertainment. Beyond the conventional media, we included internet-based newsproviders as 
well. 
We assessed the different media outlets according to the quality and extent of their 
coverage of political and social issues. We have established and examined eight typical 
categories of news content, of which four concerns the local governments: 
• Publishing the agenda of the city council 
• Reporting on the proceedings of the city council 
• Reporting on the decisions made by the local government 
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• Interviews with local decisionmakers 
 
VI.1 Pubic Sphere Index 
The further categories of news content include reporting on opposing views about 
different issues, reporting on local events and issues independent of the proceedings of the 
local government, and providing forum for citizens’ views to be heard. In every category, 
each media outlet could be given 0, 1 or 2 points, depending on the quantity and quality of its 
coverage. Thus, the maximum to be attained by any newsprovider would be 16 points. The 
ranking of the cities was established by aggregating the points achieved by the different local 
media outlets operating in it. However, if more than one media outlets were owned by the 
same owner, only the one with highest score was included in full, while the results of the 
others were included only with a weighing of 0.5. The ranking of the cities is as follows: 
 
Table 19 
Ranking City Public Sphere 
Index 
Standardized Index of 
Public Sphere 
Geographic location Size 
1. Debrecen 53,0 100 East large 
2. Tatabánya 51,0 91 West small 
3. Sopron 48,0 80 West small 
4. Szeged 42,5 60 East large 
5. Veszprém 42,0 60 West small 
6. Nagykanizsa 39,0 49 West small 
7. Pécs 38,5 46 West large 
8. Békéscsaba 37,0 40 East small 
9. Zalaegerszeg 37,0 40 West small 
10. Székesfehérvár 36,5 37 West large 
11. Kecskemét 36,0 37 East large 
12. Dunaújváros 35,5 34 West small 
13. Győr 35,0 31 West large 
14. Hódmezővásárhely 35,0 31 East small 
15. Szolnok 35,0 31 East small 
16. Szombathely 33,0 26 West small 
17. Miskolc 32,0 20 East large 
18. Salgótarján 31,5 20 East small 
19. Kaposvár 29,5 11 West small 
20. Szekszárd 26,5 0 West small 
21. Eger 26,0 0 East small 
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 Taking a closer look at the local media environments reveals the following tendencies. The 
leading source of news in each city is typically still one large daily newspaper with 
countywide circulation. Above this, there are usually only weekly papers. Television stations 
are usually owned by the local governments, and it is rare for a city to have more than one 
television station. By contrast, most radio stations are privately owned; however, they provide 
significantly less political and social news content than the televisions. A welcome tendency 
is the strengthening of internet-based newsportals that, despite their as yet small readership, 
prove an increasingly important factor of the local public sphere. 
Unsurprisingly, we found that the somewhat wealthier Western cities have a slightly 
richer media market than their Eastern counterparts. Even less surprising was the finding that 
the structure of the media environment strongly correlates with city size. Cities with more 
than 100,000 inhabitants scored 47, as compared with the figure of 37 achieved by the smaller 
cities. 
 
Methodological observations about the Public Sphere Index 
An important obstacle of getting reliable information about local media markets is the absence 
of acknowledged audits of circulation and viewership of the different media outlets. 
Therefore, in our figures large dailies figure with the same weight as relatively fresh internet 
newsportals. A significant improvement of methodology could be secured if somehow 
reliable figures could be obtained about the actual impact of these different media. 
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VII. Participation Index 
 
The Participation Index is intended to measure the extent of involvement by the citizens in the 
affairs of their local communities. Voter turnout and the number of candidates per voting 
districts is just one dimension of participation. Equally important is the number of nonprofit 
voluntary organizations in proportion of the size of the local population, or the number of 
volunteers in electoral campaigns or the circulation of newspapers with extensive political 
coverage compared, once again, to the size of the population. However, as there are no 
reliable data on the last two components, the Participation Index is restricted to the following 
indicators: 
• Voter turnout 
• Number of candidates per districts 
• Structure of the local civil society 
In connection with voter turnout, we included in the calculation, beyond the figures of the 
1998 and 2002 municipal elections, the data of the 1998 and 2002 national legislative 
elections as well (but only in the first round of the vote). Both reflect the political activity of 
the local society, but since turnout at the municipal elections is related to the willingness of 
citizens to take part in local affairs, those figures were weighed twice as much as turnout at 
the national elections. Based on this calculation, the ranking is as follows: 
 
Table 20 
Ranking City Average turnout at 
municipal elections (%) 
Average turnout at national 
legislative elections (%) 
Weighed 
average (%) 
1. Hódmezővásárhely 50,73 63,26 55,37 
2. Győr 46,75 68,57 54,28 
3. Veszprém 45,04 70,90 54,00 
4. Szekszárd 44,54 69,51 53,74 
5. Sopron 44,63 70,35 53,39 
6. Székesfehérvár 46,38 67,14 53,12 
7. Szombathely 45,43 66,00 52,90 
8. Eger 43,78 69,73 52,56 
9. Szolnok 44,21 69,49 52,47 
10. Kaposvár 45,89 64,92 52,41 
11. Zalaegerszeg 41,50 68,74 50,87 
12. Pécs 39,85 66,78 49,04 
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13. Miskolc 40,54 65,09 48,97 
14. Salgótarján 40,62 63,55 48,42 
15. Debrecen 40,29 62,17 47,89 
16. Békéscsaba 38,54 63,44 47,30 
17. Tatabánya 38,46 62,13 46,60 
18. Szeged 37,13 63,96 46,30 
19. Dunaújváros 36,86 63,61 45,94 
20. Nagykanizsa 35,93 63,39 45,42 
21. Kecskemét 35,79 60,70 44,77 
 
While voter turnout indicates the citizens’ willingness to participate in local affairs in general, 
the number of candidates per districts sheds light on the activity of those who are already 
involved in one way or another, and also on the fragmentation of the local party structure. 
One gets the figure for each city by dividing the overall number of candidates with the 
number of voting district in the city. Here, of course, only the figures of the 1998 and 2002 
municipal elections were taken into account. The ranking is as follows: 
 
Table 21 
Ranking City Average number of 
candidates per district (1998)
Average number of 
candidates per district (2002) 
Average of the 
two elections 
1. Kecskemét 9,42 8,83 9,13 
2. Dunaújváros 10,07 8,00 9,03 
3. Tatabánya 9,94 7,25 8,59 
4. Győr 9,95 7,14 8,55 
5. Debrecen 8,63 8,10 8,37 
6. Nagykanizsa 8,60 7,73 8,17 
7. Szeged 9,08 7,08 8,08 
8. Miskolc 8,48 7,56 8,02 
9. Pécs 7,48 8,25 7,87 
10. Békéscsaba 6,88 8,81 7,84 
11. Eger 7,60 6,87 7,23 
12. Szombathely 6,71 6,82 6,76 
13. Kaposvár 7,44 5,94 6,69 
14. Szolnok 6,65 6,56 6,60 
15. Szekszárd 6,14 6,29 6,21 
16. Salgótarján 6,00 6,36 6,18 
17. Hódmezővásárhely 7,14 5,00 6,07 
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18. Székesfehérvár 6,26 5,58 5,92 
19. Zalaegerszeg 5,81 5,69 5,75 
20. Veszprém 6,38 5,07 5,72 
21. Sopron 5,60 5,33 5,47 
 
The idea behind including the structure of civil society in this index is the potential political 
impact of voluntary organizations. It is an established fact that horizontally organized 
societies are more capable to organize politically as well, and to influence policy decisions. 
Therefore, the density of voluntary organizations, including the patently nonpolitical ones, 
indirectly indicates the capacity of the local society to politically mobilize itself. The table 
bellow shows the number of voluntary nonprofit organizations per 1000 persons. 
 
Table 22 
Ranking City Nonprofit organizations per 1000 
persons 
1. Veszprém 12,94 
2. Szekszárd 11,99 
3. Kaposvár 11,23 
4. Eger 11,17 
5. Zalaegerszeg 10,59 
6. Salgótarján 9,51 
7. Szolnok 9,15 
8. Békéscsaba 8,78 
9. Pécs 8,64 
10. Szombathely 8,37 
11. Miskolc 8,21 
12. Debrecen 8,00 
13. Kecskemét 7,72 
14. Szeged 7,70 
15. Győr 7,68 
16. Sopron 7,66 
17. Nagykanizsa 6,92 
18. Székesfehérvár 6,59 
19. Tatabánya 6,49 
20. Hódmezővásárhely 5,92 
21. Dunaújváros 4,46 
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VII.1 Participation Index 
The three indicators included in the Participation Index (voter turnout, number of candidates 
per district, civil society) reflect the performance of the community of citizens in a given city 
rather than the performance of the city council or the local policy makers. Of course, the 
decisions and actions of the latter may influence the former, but if there is indeed such an 
indirect impact, it is impossible to track it within such a short period of time that was covered 
in this research. At any rate, it is hard to see how that impact could be reliably measured even 
in the long run. 
The Participation Index shows very little variation with the size of a city, and it is only 
slightly more correlated with geographic location (50 points average in the Western cities as 
compared with 45 points in the Eastern ones). 
 
Table 23: Participation Index 
Ranking City Participation Index 
(average of standardized 
indicators) 
Participation 
Index (100-
degree scale)
Geographic 
location 
Size 
1. Eger 63 100 East small 
2. Veszprém 63 100 West small 
3. Győr 62 99 West large 
4. Szekszárd 60 98 West small 
5. Kaposvár 48 87 West small 
6. Szolnok 13 59 East small 
7. Szombathely 9 55 West small 
8. Pécs 6 53 West large 
9. Miskolc 3 50 East large 
10. Debrecen -1 47 East large 
11. Zalaegerszeg -4 45 West small 
12. Békéscsaba -9 40 East small 
13. Kecskemét -15 36 East large 
14. Hódmezővásárhely -25 27 East small 
15. Szeged -30 23 East large 
16. Tatabánya -31 22 West small 
17. Salgótarján -33 21 East small 
18. Sopron -34 20 West small 
19. Székesfehérvár -41 14 West large 
20. Nagykanizsa -48 8 West small 
21. Dunaújváros -58 0 West small 
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VII.2 Methodological observations about the Participation Index 
As indicated above, the number of volunteers during the electoral campaigns, the size of the 
audience at campaign rallies and other events, may provide useful information about the 
participation of the local society. Likewise, the registered membership of local party chapters 
as well as of the voluntary organizations is certainly very significant. However, these data are 
very difficult to obtain and in many cases may require extended fieldwork. An even more 
complicated task could be capturing, over and above the sheer numbers, the quality of 
participation in local affairs. One such indicator may be the amount of information requests 
filed by citizens to the local governments under Hungary’s rather radical Freedom of 
Information Act of 1992. In fact, we tried to obtain these figures from the city 
administrations, but no reliable data were forthcoming. 
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VIII. Summary I: Local Government Democracy Performance 
 
Lawfulness, transparency and the responsiveness segment of the Representation Index are 
those dimensions of local democracy that can be directly affected by the decisions and actions 
of the local decision-makers and elected officials. Therefore, the democratic performace of 
the local governments of the twenty-two cities are best captured in these dimensions, as 
distinct from the dimensions of representation, the public sphere and participation that 
reveal the democratic characteristics of the local society rather than those of the local 
government. The indicators making up the Lawfulness Index, the Transparency Index, and the 
responsiveness segment of the Representation Index together constitute the Democratic 
Performance Index (DPI), measuring the overall democratic inclinations and practices of the 
local leaders and officials. The other remaining indicators make up the Democratic Society 
Index (DSI). In Summary I, we discuss the DPI ranking of the twenty-two cities. The 
following table shows the democratic performance of the local governments: 
 
Table 24 
Ranking City Democratic Performance Index 
1. Zalaegerszeg 60 
2. Győr 60 
3. Szolnok 57 
4. Dunaújváros 57 
5. Kaposvár 55 
6. Sopron 53 
7. Békéscsaba 52 
8. Kecskemét 52 
9. Hódmezővásárhely 51 
10. Szombathely 51 
11. Pécs 50 
12. Veszprém 50 
13. Szeged 49 
14. Nagykanizsa 49 
15. Tatabánya 48 
16. Miskolc 48 
17. Eger 46 
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18. Salgótarján 45 
19. Debrecen 45 
20. Székesfehérvár 44 
21. Szekszárd 38 
 
A cursory glance at the table shows a striking dominance of Western cities at the top 
of the table: only one in the top six cities (Szolnok) is located East of the Danube. However, 
since the bottom of the table is also occupied by western cities, the overall difference between 
the democratic performance of the local governments east and west of the Danube is 
negligible. In all, city size makes little difference in the overall democratic performance of the 
local governments. As noted above, smaller cities tend to perform notably better in the 
Lawfulness Index, but this difference is mostly offset by the better showing of larger cities in 
transparency. 
An interesting issue might be the correlation of democratic performance with the 
political orientation of the coalitions that govern the different cities. Here, it must be kept in 
mind that while most of the data comes from the years 2001 and 2002, some of the figures 
refer to 2003, and that the municipal elections at the end of 2002 brought changes in the 
leadership of a number of the twenty-two cities examined here. Therefore, in assessing this 
issue, some of the time one has to consider the pre-2002 leadership, while at other times the 
current ones. With those caveats, the findings are as follows. The indicators within the 
Lawfulness Index refer to 2001 and 2002, and considering the pre-2002 leadership of the 22 
cities we find that left-leaning coalitions have a 10-point lead in this index. By contrast, right-
leaning cities have a 6- to 7-point lead in transparency and responsiveness. Based on the 
current distribution of power, right-leaning cities have a 3-point edge in the overall 
Democratic Performance Index; however, if the Lawfulness Index is calculated with the then-
existing distribution of power, the overall difference shrinks to less than 2 points. 
 
Table 25: Democratic Performance Index 
Average score Lawfulness Index 
Transparency 
Index 
Responsiveness 
Index DPI 
Location West of Danube 
(N=12) 51 50 52 51 
 East of Danube (N=9) 50 51 48 50 
Size Smaller (N=14) 52 50 50 51 
 Larger (N=7) 48 51 50 50 
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Left (N=16) 52 49 49 50 Current 
coalition Right (N=5) 47 55 56 53 
Left (N=10) 56 48 50 51 Pre-2002 
coalition Right (N=11) 46 53 50 50 
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IX. Summary II: Democratic Society 
 
The Democratic Society Index consists of the representation portion of the 
Representation Index, the Public Sphere Index, and the Participation Index. Since the Public 
Sphere Index consists of a single indicator, the often huge differences are not blunted by the 
presence of other indicators. Therefore, this single index has a larger impact on the overall 
DSI than the others. Debrecen’s outstanding position is due to this factor. The ranking of the 
cities is as follows: 
 
Table 26 
Ranking City Democratic Society Index 
1. Debrecen 68 
2. Zalaegerszeg 65 
3. Veszprém 65 
4. Sopron 64 
5. Pécs 59 
6. Tatabánya 58 
7. Hódmezővásárhely 57 
8. Kaposvár 55 
9. Szolnok 55 
10. Szeged 53 
11. Miskolc 49 
12. Győr 49 
13. Székesfehérvár 46 
14. Salgótarján 45 
15. Szekszárd 41 
16. Kecskemét 40 
17. Eger 38 
18. Nagykanizsa 38 
19. Szombathely 38 
20. Békéscsaba 34 
21. Dunaújváros 31 
 
As far as geographic location is concerned, it is only in the size of the media market 
that the wealthier Western part of the country has some notable advantage. City size, too, 
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correlates with the size of the media market, and since the larger cities attained a better 
average score in representation, it follows that larger-than-100, 000 cities fared better overall 
in the DSI. As for political orientation, the societies of the currently right-leaning cities scored 
better in all three indices as well as in the overall DSI. 
 
Table 27: Democratic Society Index 
Average score Representation Index 
Public 
Sphere Index
Participation 
Index 
Demokratikus 
Társadalom 
Index 
West of Danube (N=12) 48 52 52 51 Geographic 
location East of Danube (N=9) 
53 
4
7 47 49
Small (N=14) 47 47 54 49
Size 
Large (N=7) 57 56 43 52
Left (N=16) 46 49 48 48
Governing 
coalition 
Right (N=5) 63 52 56 57
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X. Summary III: Overall Local Democracy 
Finally, the Local Democracy Index (LDI) summarizes the overall state of local 
democracy in the twenty-two cities. We also assessed local democracy according to 
geographic location, city size and political orientation of the ruling coalitions. The position of 
the cities in the six indices (the Representation Index is divided here into Representation 
proper and Responsiveness) is as follows: 
 
Table 28: Final ranking in six indices 
Representation 
City Lawfulness Index 
Transparency 
Index Responsiveness 
Index 
Representation 
Index 
Public 
Sphere 
Index 
Participationn 
Index 
Békéscsaba 60 37 59 17 50 36 
Debrecen 45 56 35 64 100 41 
Dunaújváros 65 49 57 46 44 3 
Eger 53 43 42 34 11 69 
Győr 45 55 79 51 43 52 
Hódmezővásárhely 35 54 65 72 43 57 
Kaposvár 49 64 52 60 23 84 
Kecskemét 47 51 58 42 46 32 
Miskolc 56 42 45 73 32 42 
Nagykanizsa 41 55 50 34 57 24 
Pécs 59 48 44 76 55 46 
Salgótarján 41 54 40 62 30 43 
Sopron 48 58 52 46 88 58 
Szeged 49 68 32 54 69 36 
Székesfehérvár 33 40 59 42 48 48 
Szekszárd 48 34 33 33 13 78 
Szolnok 60 54 57 32 43 64 
Szombathely 54 48 50 50 35 55 
Tatabánya 54 46 44 47 99 28 
Veszprém 62 53 34 42 67 86 
Zalaegerszeg 59 52 69 81 50 66 
 
The Local Democracy Index is produced by the mean of the six indices. Thus, the final 
overall ranking of the cities in the LDI is the following: 
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Table 29: Local Democracy Index 
Ranking City Local Democracy Index 
1. Zalaegerszeg 63 
2. Sopron 58 
3. Veszprém 57 
4. Debrecen 57 
5. Szolnok 56 
6. Kaposvár 55 
7. Pécs 54 
8. Hódmezővásárhely 54 
9. Győr 54 
10. Tatabánya 53 
11. Szeged 51 
12. Miskolc 48 
13. Kecskemét 46 
14. Salgótarján 45 
15. Székesfehérvár 45 
16. Szombathely 44 
17. Dunaúj
város 44 
18. Nagyk
anizsa 43 
19. Békésc
saba 43 
20. Eger 42 
21. Szeksz
árd 40 
 
It is to be noticed that the distribution of the cities in the LDI is confined to a relatively 
narrow segment, between 63 points in Sopron and 40 points in Szekszárd. It may be 
worthwhile at this point to compare the two major constituents of the LDI, i.e. the Democratic 
Performance Index and the Democratic Society Index, to see if there is any significant 
correlation between the democratic attitudes and practices to be found in local communities 
and the democratic performance of the elected officials in the same community. 
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Table 30: DPI and LSI 
Ranking Size Democratic Performance Index Ranking City 
Democratic Society 
Index 
1. Zalaegerszeg 60 1. Debrecen 68 
2. Győr 60 2. Zalaegerszeg 66 
3. Szolnok 57 3. Veszprém 65 
4. Dunaújváros 57 4. Sopron 64 
5. Kaposvár 55 5. Pécs 59 
6. Sopron 53 6. Tatabánya 58 
7. Békéscsaba 52 7. Hódmezővásárhely 57 
8. Kecskemét 52 8. Kaposvár 55 
9. Hódmezővásárhely 51 9. Szeged 53 
10. Szombathely 51 10. Miskolc 49 
11. Pécs 50 11. Győr 49 
12. Veszprém 50 12. Szombathely 47 
13. Szeged 49 13. Szolnok 46 
14. Nagykanizsa 49 14. Székesfehérvár 46 
15. Tatabánya 48 15. Salgótarján 45 
16. Miskolc 48 16. Szekszárd 41 
17. Eger 46 17. Kecskemét 40 
18. Salgótarján 45 18. Eger 38 
19. Debrecen 45 19. Nagykanizsa 38 
20. Székesfehérvár 44 20. Békéscsaba 34 
21. Szekszárd 38 21. Dunaújváros 31 
 
If we compare the rankings according to democratic performance and according to the 
democratic practices of the local society, we find surprisingly little correlation between the 
two rankings. There are only four cities (Zalaegerszeg, Kaposvár, Sopron és 
Hódmezővásárhely) to make it to the top ten in both rankings, and there are some striking 
discrepancies. Debrecen, for instance, come in the top of the Democratic Society Index and 
ranks 19th of 22 in the DPI. By contrast, Dunaújváros ranks 21nd in the DSI and comes in 4th 
in the DPI. While the local societies tend to be more democratic in the Western part of the 
country than in the Eastern and middle regions, the democratic performance of the respective 
local governments does not significantly differ. Likewise, city size correlates with DSI but not 
with DPI: local society in smaller cities tends to be more democratic, but just by a small 
margin. The most significant correlation is to be found with the political orientation of the 
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ruling coalitions. Cities with right-leaning coalitions (as of 2003) fared better both in the DSI 
and in the DPI. 
 
Table 31 
Average score Democratic 
Performance Index 
Democratic 
Society Index 
Local Democracy 
Index 
West of Danube (N=12) 51 51 51 Geographic 
Location East of Danube (N=9) 50 49 49 
Small (N=14) 51 49 50 Size 
Large  (N=7) 50 52 51 
Left (N=16) 50 48 49 Governing 
Coalition 
(present) Right (N=5) 53 57 55 
Left (N=10) 51 48 50 Pre-2002 
coalition 
Right (N=11) 50 51 51 
 
A number of precautionary remarks are in order here, to avoid unfounded conclusions. 
First of all, the left- or right-orientation of different cities does not seem to correlate 
significantly either with city size or geographic locations. In other words, in detecting a 
moderate amount of correlation between local democracy and political orientation, it is likely 
that the correlation is not the effect of some other factor. On the other hand, it is far from clear 
what kind of mechanism is operating here. Furthermore, the correlation discerned here should 
not be generalized, because the twenty-two cities covered in this research are not 
representative of the totality of Hungarian local governments. 
What might be the explanation of the better showing of right-leaning cities in the 
Local Democracy Index? The findings of this research suggest no obvious answer. Even to 
begin to develop a hypothesis, one has to proceed with great caution. First of all, due to their 
far larger numbers (16), left-leaning cities constitute a much more heterogenous group than 
the right-leaning ones (5). Second, it has to be considered that in the 2002 municipal 
elections, six cities went from right to left, while no city in this sample went from left to right. 
Therefore, if we assume that past performance affects the voters’ decisions, it may be 
reasonable to infer that the left-wing landslide of 2002 has been survived by only those right-
led cities that showed an above-the-average overall performance, components of which may 
be such things as responsiveness, transparency, etc. that favorably affect a city’s ranking in 
the DPI and LDI. Therefore, the five remaining right-led cities are among the most 
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democratic ones overall, and while there are certainly five comparably democratic cities 
among the left-governed ones, the ones with mediocre and poor ranking make the average 
weaker on the left. In fact, the average score of the top five left-governed cities in the Local 
Democracy Index is marginally higher (55,8) than the average score of the five right-
governed cities (55). This hypothesis is supported by the fact that considering the pre-2002 
situation, the difference between left- and right-leaning cities all but disappears. While this 
hypothesis is very difficult to test, it does not explain why the right-wing cities fare better in 
the Democratic Society Index as well. In any case, this hypothesis is highly speculative and 
must be tested in further research. 
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XI. Methodological Limitations and Conclusions 
 
The validity of the observations on local democracy yielded by this research is limited 
by a number of circumstances. First of all, the innovative character of the project made it 
necessary for the authors to resort to highly creative and therefore untested methods, the 
validity and reliability of which may not be borne out in future researches. The second general 
constraint was the limited amount of time that had been available for the research. Due to this 
circumstance, the gathering and processing of the information took place almost 
simultaneously, making the assessment of deeper correlations and evaluative analysis 
impossible. 
In selecting the different indicators, one has to take into account a variety of criteria, 
such as 
• Relevance 
• Reliability 
• Variation 
• Accessibility 
The selection of the indicators took place in advance, with very limited discussion with 
practitioners and local government officials. Therefore, even though the authors are certain 
that the selected indicators are relevant from the point of view of democracy, the assessment 
of our findings by practitioners and officials may greatly benefit future researches and 
contribute to their success. Some of the figures in this study are perfectly reliable, such as 
voting statistics, for instance. Others, however, may require further scrutiny that was 
impossible to exercise in the current research, due to the time constrainst. It has to be stated, 
therefore, that the authors could not check the validity of the data provided by the local 
governments. A number of very promising indicators had to be removed from the analysis, 
often in the last moment, because they showed no variation between the different cities. 
More extensive data gathering may help us to use these indicators in future researches. Often 
the very prosaic condition of accessibility determined which indicators would be used in our 
final assessment. The requirements of reliability and relevance sometimes had to be 
subordinated to the demand of getting measurable information in a short period of time. More 
time and more extensive fieldwork may in the future significantly widen the scope of 
accessible information. 
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Confronting the findings of this research with practitioners and researchers in the field 
may significantly contribute to fine-tuning the methodology of measuring local democracy. 
That will be the task of future projects. As far as the current one is concerned, the 
methodological limitations discussed above make precaution in handling the conclusions of 
this study a supreme imperative. 
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